Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2010

Shannon Glenn Winward v. State of Utah : Reply
Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Utah Attorney General; Criminal Appeals Division; Counsel for Appellee.
Grant W. P. Morrison; Matthew G. Morrison; Morrison and Morrison, L.C.; Counsel for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Winward v. Utah, No. 20101005 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2010).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2674

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SHANNON GLENN WINWARD,
Petitioner and Appellant
vs.

CaseNo.20101005-SC

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent and Appellee.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT SHANNON GLEN WINWARD

GRANT W. P. MORRISON
MATTHEW G. MORRISON
Morrison & Morrison, L.C.
Bank of the West Building
142 East 200 South, Suite 312
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Counsel for Appellant
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
Criminal Appeals Division
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Counsel for Appellee

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

MAR - 7 2012

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SHANNON GLENN WINWARD,
Petitioner and Appellant
Case No. 20101005-SC

vs.
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent and Appellee.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT SHANNON GLEN WINWARD

GRANT W. P. MORRISON
MATTHEW G. MORRISON
Morrison & Morrison, L.C.
Bank of the West Building
142 East 200 South, Suite 312
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Counsel for Appellant
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
Criminal Appeals Division
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Counsel for Appellee

i
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iv

ARGUMENT
I.

1

THIS COURT SHOULD CONSIDER MR. WINWARD'S
CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS
A.

B.

MR. WINWARD'S CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS WERE
PRESERVED UNDER THE "EGREGIOUS INJUSTICE"
EXCEPTION
THE PCRA'S STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND PRESENTS AN "EGREGIOUS
INJUSTICE"

1

1

...1

II.

THIS COURT SHOULD ALLOW AN EXCEPTION TO THE PCRA'S
TIME BAR: Enforcement of the PCRA'S Time Bar in This Case, Including
the Tolling Provision, Would Result in an Egregious Injustice
3

III.

DISMISSING WINWARD'S PETITION WOULD AMOUNT TO AN
EGREGIOUS INJUSTICE

...4

A. Mr. Winward Had "Good Cause" for His Petition and Allowing His
Petition to Move Forward is in the "Interests of Justice"
4
1. Mr. Winward's Claims are Meritorious

6

a. Mr. Winward's trial counsel was ineffective for not
presenting evidence that T.W. initially denied the allegations
for three months
7
b. Mr. Winward's trial counsel was ineffective in keeping
Douglas Bills, a biased juror, on the jury
8
c. Mr. Winward's trial counsel was ineffective for not calling
witnesses from the first trial to his second trial
9
d. Mr. Winward's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
adequately explain the State's plea offer
11
ii
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Mr. Winward's trial counsel was ineffective for not
meeting with him before the second trial

12

Mr. Winward's trial counsel was ineffective for not calling
T.W.'s caseworker, a forensic child psychologist, or a
medical expert
13
Mr. Winward's trial counsel was ineffective for raising his
own effectiveness on appeal
16
Mr. Winward has shown cumulative error

in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES
Carper v. DeLand, 54 F3.d 613 (19th Cir. 1995)

3

Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 789 (2011)

15

STATE CASES
Adams v. State, 2005 UT 62, 123 P.3d400

4, 6

Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 46, 234 P.3d 1115

1-2

Housekeeper v. State, 200$ UT 78, 197 P.3d 636

12

Hurst v. Cook, 111 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1989)

4

Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249 (Utah 1998)

3-4

Nicholls v. State, 2009 UT 12, 203 P.3d 976
State v. Greuber, 2007 UT 50, 165 P.3d 1185
State v. Lenkart, 2011 UT 27

12
11-12
12

State v. Winward, 941 P.2d 627 (Utah App. 1997)

5

STATUTES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 15

15

iv
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ARGUMENT
I.
THIS COURT SHOD LD COIN SIDES f"« I l l ' i \ INWAR11 : I
CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS
: I MR. WINWARD'S CONSTITUTIONAI
iRGl JMEN1 S WERE
PRESERVED UNDER THE "EGREGIOUS INJUSTICE" EXCEPTION
I he State argues that I"\ 1 t W iiiv. at: d's Constitutional arguments w ere notpreserv ed
ail(|

should therefore not even b e considered hv the eoinl

< Mi llie <"f!iei IKIIHI, Ihe Mile

argues that ",

- *; ihi- :~Vuri . <>uld applv liv egregious injustice" exception"

(Appellee's Brief

t r a g e 1?)

Constitutional a r g

-

procedure"

This same ! u ^ w ••.,.*• .ipplv tc M - W i n w a r d ' s
:•

(Appellee's Brief at »^"e 13)

This is the 'v^pci venue to address

Constitutional issues and that is what Mr. Winward is attempting to do with this appeal to
i;pi«N >
;^r

. 'jrceio-

.

- siiiv" ,*\.

i

. , - i M.. .in i.cti issues were p r e s e n r u muki -.11 .iinhii oi
.

* e.

be brought before the Supreme Court, but when it

., ,- •

15 b i v . u g i H DCio-iO

-

the Supreme Court

that it is now too late and must have been brought before the Trial Court.
Ill • T H E P C R A ' S S T A T U T E O F L I M I T A T I O N S I S UNC < HNS I'll I I IK I P
AND PRESENTS AN "EGREGIOUS INJUSTICE"
Again, the State approaches this argument as a new issue and thus analyzes it as if
it was not preserved. As stated bUoic, nowever,, this argument is actually a reason
behind why 11 it - "egregious ni|us1ieen eMvplimi applte in ilih i.bt"

i In

IIIIIV\ ,IM ,

arguments are based upon the "egregious injustice" exception spelled out in Gardner v.
State, 2010 UT 46, % 91, 234 P.3d 1115. I lie Consliiiiliwnal issues are sub;,,, o\ \ s
1
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"egregious exception" rather than new, separate arguments raised for the first time on
appeal Thus, these arguments were preserved because they are part and parcel of the

4

"egregious injustice" exception as provided under Gardner. They further flesh out and
demonstrate the "egregious injustice" argument rather than create a new argument
i

altogether.
The State argues that Mr. Winward's case citations were distinguished by this
Court ". . .on the basis that they 'were decided upon prior to recent amendments to the
PCRA and to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure relating to the PCRA.'" (Appellee's
Brief at page 17) However, since the new rules went into effect in 2010, there have not
been many cases taken up to challenge the Constitutionality of the new PCRA rules, so
these prior cases Eire still helpful in that regard.
Thus, the case law is primarily from the pre-2010 rules. Furthermore, the case law
has not been overturned, although the Court did note that these cases were decided prior
to the new rules. Thus, this case is one of the first to use the "egregious injustice"
exception spelled out by the Utah Supreme Court (which incidentally, was not included
in the PCRA rules—the Utah Supreme Court had the obligation to set forth this exception
pursuant to its powers).
Additionally, the State argues in its Brief that the "interests of justice" and "good
cause" exceptions are inapplicable since, it argues, the District Court did not plainly err
and that no exceptional circumstances exist. As stated above, this analysis is assuming
that these are new arguments on appeal. However, again, these arguments are subsets of
2
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the "egregious injustice" argument and go to show how an "egregious injustice" occurred
in Mr. Winward's case. It is not necessary to show that there was plain error or
exceptional circumstances because these arguments were preserved, as examples of the
egregious injustice that occurred in Mr. Winward's case.
Furthermore, these exceptions should be used as barometers in gauging whether a
case fits within the "egregious injustice exception since this Court has not yet defined
"egregious injustice."
II.

THIS COURT SHOULD ALLOW AN EXCEPTION TO THE PCRA'S
TIME BAR: Enforcement of the PCRA'S Time Bar in This Case,
Including the Tolling Provision, Would Result in an Egregious Injustice
Mr. Winward received ineffective assistance of counsel at both the trial and

appellate levels. Mr. Winward was unfamiliar with the legal system and lacked the
resources in the state prison to further his case. Furthermore, since Mr. Winward had
been represented by the same attorney for both his trial case and for his appeal, he
believed his remedies were exhausted and did not have the requisite legal knowledge
necessary to further his case.
Although the State cites to Carper v. DeLand, 54 F.3d 613 (19th Cir. 1995) for the
proposition that Utah's prison contract attorneys ". . .arrangement exceed the
constitutional requirements necessary to ensure that inmates receive access to the courts"
(page 24), that does not show that this was the case with Mr. Winward. Furthermore, as
Justice Zimmerman's concurring opinion in Julian v. State demonstrated,

"the legal

services provided to assist the prisoners are grossly inadequate." (966 P.2d 249, 259
3
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(Utah 1998)). The Julian case was decided three years after the Carper case. Justice
Zimmerman's opinion is in line with what Mr. Winward faced as a prisoner and it was
only much later when he did have enough funds to retain an attorney that he was able to
uncover the current claims.
III.

DISMISSING MR. WINWARD'S PETITION WOULD AMOUNT TO AN
EGREGIOUS INJUSTICE
A.

Mr. Winward Had "Good Cause'5 for His Petition and Allowing His
Petition to Move Forward is in the "Interests of Justice55

The State argues in its brief that the Court should not use these old standards and
in any event that it believes Mr. Winward has not met these standards anyway. However,
even the State acknowledges that the "egregious injustice" exception remains undefined.
The old standards are a good place to look in defining the "egregious injustice" exception
and that is why Mr. Winward has looked to those standards. Furthermore, Mr. Winward
can satisfy the requirements of these old standards, as seen below.
In the first part of the analysis, Mr. Winward must show that his Petition is in "the
interests of justice," with the Court considering the potential merits of his claims and the
reasons for the delay in filing. See Adams v. State, 2005 UT 62, \ 16, 123 P.3d 400. Mr.
Winward can also meet the "good cause" exception by showing that his claims were ". .
.overlooked in good faith with no intent to delay or abuse the writ." Br. Applt at 23
(quoting Hurst, 111 P.2d at 1037).
The State argues that Mr. Winward's false sense that his options were foreclosed was
an ". . .unreasonable reading of the court of appeals' opinion (Appellee's Brief at page
4
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28). Importantly, however, the State's opinion of what is a reasonable interpretation is
based upon the State's appellate attorneys' analysis of the case law. Mr. Winward does
not have the education, background, nor experience, nor anything even close to the
State's appellate attorneys. Indeed, it can be presumed most attorneys in the State of
Utah do not have this type of experience.
It is unreasonable for the State to confer its own definition of "reasonableness" to
Mr. Winward. What is more reasonable is that Mr. Winward was relying on his attorney
to know the law and to represent him in his case, and it was reasonable for Mr. Winward
to rely on his attorney to do so. Mr. Winward also relied on his attorney's interpretation
of the opinion from the Court of Appeals and his attorney was ineffective for failing to
explain to Mr. Winward his options beyond that point. The interpretation of case law is
what Mr. Winward's attorney was hired to do, not to pass it on to Mr. Winward and
assume that he understood everything, including possible appeals and further ineffective
assistance of counsel arguments.
The State further argues that the Court of Appeals rejected Mr. Winward's
ineffective assistance claim ". . .because it did not claim prejudice". (Appellee's Brief at
page 28, quoting State v. Winward, 941 P.2d 627, 635 (1997)). However, Mr. Winward's
trial and appellate counsel, Edward Brass' ("Brass") continued representation is the
problem with that analysis.
However, Brass's representation of his own ineffective assistance of counsel for
Mr. Winward in the unenviable and dubious position of arguing for his own ineffective
5
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assistance of counsel, i.e., that he made some big mistakes, or on the other hand, arguing
slightly for the cause and getting a published opinion that he did no wrong. Brass's
allegiances were split, ostensibly arguing for his client that he, Brass, was ineffective
while not pushing too hard because of malpractice considerations. That, in the best of
circumstances, is an obvious conflict of interest. Thus, this opinion from the Court of
Appeals is marred by the continued representation of Brass, and once Brass received the
opinion, he had no motivation to further his client's interests by explaining his further
options or that he should not have represented him in the appeal.
In sum, Mr. Winward relied, in good faith, on his advocate and attorney, Brass,
to guide him through the legal process, including his appeals. Although all of his
avenues may not have been actually exhausted at that time, Mr. Winward, the
unsophisticated prison inmate, believed they were and his attorney failed to advise him of
his options or to pursue all of his remedies. Mr. Winward has met the exceptions to the
PCRA procedural bar under the "interests of justice" "good cause" and "egregious
injustice" exception. His claims are meritorious. This will be demonstrated below.
1. Mr. Winward's Claims are Meritorious
This Court must decide if Mr. Winward's claims are "potentially meritorious" to
justify an exception to the procedural time bar as contained in the PCRA. Adams, 2005
UT 62,ffl[23, 26. Mr. Winward has meritorious claims of several instances of ineffective
assistance of counsel, as follows:

6
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a. Mr. Winward's trial counsel was ineffective for not presenting
evidence that T.W. initially denied the allegations for three months
Mr. Winward initially argued that attorney Brass was ineffective for his failing to
present evidence that T.W. initially denied the allegations for three months (Br. Aplt. at
25-27). The State argues that "although the evidence may have supported this argument,
Winward cites no authority holding that an attorney must argue every reasonable
inference from the evidence." (Appellee's Brief at page 32). The State further argues
that "The precise period during which T.W. denied was immaterial." (Appellee's Brief at
page 33). The State's arguments misconstrue Mr. Winward's arguments.
Mr. Winward never argued that Brass was ineffective for failing to "argue every
reasonable inference from the evidence." Rather, Mr. Winward was arguing a specific
point; i.e., that Brass was ineffective for failing to present evidence that T.W. initially
denied the allegations for three months. This goes beyond merely being an inference
from the evidence but rather a critical point in the evidence that should have been
emphasized to the jury. Failing to note this time was not "immaterial" but rather was
crucial in showing that T.W.'s credibility was suspect.
In a rape case, credibility is of the utmost importance and failing to bring this
matter before the jury severely hampered Mr. Winward's defense and prejudiced him
from presenting his defense. The three month time frame is critical in that T.W.'s
credibility should have been impeached, which would have also led to the specter of
others coaching this witness, which could then have also been used against the other
witnesses as well. This prejudice led directly to Mr. Winward's conviction, resulting in
7
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

an egregious injustice.
b. Mr. Winward's trial counsel was ineffective in keeping Douglas
Bills, a biased juror, on the jury
The State argues here that Brass cannot be shown to have been ineffective in
keeping Douglas Bills ("Bills") on the jury in Mr. Winward's case. The State argues first
that "Brass was evidently satisfied with Bills' assurance that he would be impartial."
However, this choice to keep Bills on the jury was not plausibly justifiable, given his
deep-seated biases and distraction with his master's thesis defense.

Bills' law-

enforcement oriented attitude and the fact that he had a sister who had been a victim of
sex abuse, combined with the preceding, leave little doubt that he should have been
excluded from the jury. The real question is would you want this person on YOUR jury
if you were a suspect, and the answer is a simple resounding NO. This prejudiced Mr.
Winward and resulted in his conviction, which under these circumstances is an egregious
injustice.
The State also argues that "the record contradicts Winward's claims that Bills was
distracted by his master's thesis defense." (Appellee's Brief at page 37). The record
actually demonstrates that the master's thesis defense was a distraction to Bills. In fact, it
was on Bills' mind enough that he mentioned it on the record. Further, he was concerned
about it enough that he stated: "I've got questions in my mind, are we going to get it done
by Thursday? There's a panic feeling in my mind too. I'll be saying let's hurry up and
get this thing done because I have to go somewhere." C.R. 474.
The State points out that the verdict was reached on May 31, but that was just in
8
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time for Bills to get to his thesis defense, which happened to be the next day. It's no
surprise or leap of logic that Bills was in a rush to get to his master's defense on time and
this resulted in an early conviction. Bills even mentioned it was an issue, but once he
was on the jury, he was able to assist in getting the verdict done early enough so it would
no longer be a worry. Not surprisingly, the jury reached a guilty verdict on Wednesday,
May 31, at 4:45 pm, less than 24 hours before Mr. Bills had to leave to defense his
master's thesis. Bills should have been dismissed by Brass and failing to dismiss this
jury resulted in an egregious injustice in Mr. Winward's convictions.
c. Mr. Winward's trial counsel was ineffective for not calling
witnesses from the first trial at his second trial
The State argues next that Brass was not ineffective for not calling the scoutmaster
and the teacher in the second trial (whom he had called in the first trial). The hung jury
in the first trial (in which these witnesses did testify) proves otherwise.
The State argues first that the scoutmaster was unnecessary in so much that R.W.
provided the same testimony as the scoutmaster (Appellee's Brief at page 39-40). That
argument is flawed for many reasons.
First, Brass should have called the scoutmaster who would have testified not only
as to the "good touch/bad touch" during the time of the alleged abuse, but also that the
alleged victims never approached him with any concerns. In this type of case, where
credibility is of the utmost concern, this evidence was critical to Mr. Winward's defense
in showing another, independent witness, who never noticed nor heard of any bad
touching despite interacting with the alleged victim every single week and having the
9
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relationship as a trusted scoutmaster.
Second, having the evidence go through R.W. only helped the jury to identify with

{

R.W. more rather than having the evidence come through an independent, unbiased third
party. Apparently, according to the State, Brass could have used R.W. as his only
i

witness and covered all of his bases. By doing this, Brass was ineffective as counsel for
Mr. Winward and this ineffectiveness directly resulted in prejudice to Mr. Winward, as
evidenced by his conviction on his second trial compared to the hung jury on his first trial
(where these witnesses did testify).
Similarly, Brass should have called T.W.'s teacher to testify at the second trial,
just as he did in the first trial. Just as the scoutmaster was a trusted adult, the teacher was
an independent, unbiased witness who could testify of her observations of T.W., but this
time on a daily basis for the majority of the school day. Her live testimony, especially
combined with the scoutmaster's testimony, would have gone directly against the alleged
victim's testimonies. Unfortunately for Mr. Winward, in the second trial only the alleged
victims testified rather than these two witnesses.
The State argues that ". . .even if the teacher's live testimony would have
convinced the jury to completely disbelieve T.W., the jury still could have convicted
Winward as charged based on R.W.'s and A.F.'s testimony." (Appellee's Brief at page
40). This argument fails. Of course the jury could have convicted Winward based upon
any evidence. The jury could have done whatever it wanted to in regards to its verdict.
However, the evidence shows that when this testimony was properly introduced, as in the
10
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first trial, the jury affirmatively chose not to convict, instead resulting in a hung trial.
Rather than speculating as to what the jury "could have done" the Court can look at what
the jury did do when this evidence was actually presented, as it was in the first trial.
d. Mr. Winward's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
adequately explain the State's plea offer
The State argues that Mr. Winward's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
during the plea bargain stage fails under State v. Greuber, 2007 UT 50 <[[11, 165 P.3d
1185, ". . .where this Court held that a fair trial negates any possible prejudice arising
from deficient representation during the plea bargaining process." (Appellee's Brief at
page 41). The State argues alternatively that the Greuber rule should not be overturned
because it was unpreserved, and even under the Greuber rule, that Mr. Winward did not
have an unfair trial. The evidence points otherwise.
First, as to the State's claims that the arguments were unpreserved, these
arguments are also enveloped under the "egregious exception" ambit. In other words,
these arguments were preserved because they demonstrate why this case is an "egregious
exception" and this is one of the reasons.
Second, the Greuber rule should be overturned and this Court should recognize
the opposite holding, as is the case with many other jurisdictions. The plea stage is
independent of the trial stage and could have resolved the case prior to trial (which occurs
in the vast majority of cases), to the satisfaction of all parties. The Defendant should
have effective counsel at this stage of the proceedings to ensure that his case is advocated
to its fullest by counsel. By failing to overturn the Greuber rule, the Court would be
11
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denying the Defendant effective counsel at this stage in his case, potentially resulting in
convictions of much more serious offenses, as has occurred in this case.

<

Third, should the Court continue the Greuberrale,Mr. Winward has shown that
he did not have a fair trial, for all the reasons enumerated previously. These instances of
ineffective assistance of counsel resulted in an unfair trial for Mr. Winward. Each
instance as described herein and in Appellant's Brief, resulted in Mr. Winward's
conviction, based upon the unfair trial. Mr. Winward did have a fair trial in his first trial,
which resulted in a hung jury but in the second trial (when Brass failed to communicate
the plea bargain) had numerous instances of ineffective assistance of counsel and that
resulted in Mr. Winward5s unfair trial. Thus, even under the current Greuber rule, his
conviction should be reversed and remanded for a new trial based on this egregious
injustice.
e. Mr. Winward's trial counsel was ineffective for not meeting with
him before the second trial
The State argues that regardless of the amount of time spent with Mr. Winward,
Brass was not ineffective in this aspect, especially since he had already had one trial with
Mr. Winward (Appellee's Brief at pages 42-43). The State points to Nicholls v. State,
2009 UT 12 P 8 , 203 P.3d 976 for the notion that this Court has "refused to hold that
counsel is ineffective based on the amount of time counsel spent working on the case or
consulting with a client."
However, in this case, Brass failed to meet with Mr. Winward even once prior to
his second trial. Certainly the Court would recognize that there is a difference between
12
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spending adequate time and spending no time meeting with a defendant, which is what
took place. This goes beyond just time spent "consulting with a client" but also to
preparation and the defendant having knowledge of what is occurring and what to expect.
In this case, Mr. Winward suffered prejudice. Mr. Winward took the witness
stand without any preparation of what to expect this time around and Brass should have
met with Mr. Winward to prepare Mr. Winward for his testimony. Furthermore, Brass
should have met with Mr. Winward to analyze whether to even have Mr. Winward testify
or not. Instead, Mr. Winward went in blindly to trial, not having met with his attorney at
all and relying on him to present his defense, despite never having even met prior to the
second trial. There was zero preparation time for Mr. Winward to anticipate hostile
questions or even to prepare answers for his own attorney's questions. This resulted in
prejudice to Mr. Winward and made the second trial an egregious injustice.
f. Mr. Winward's trial counsel was ineffective for not calling T.W.'s
caseworker, a forensic child psychologist, or a medical expert as
witnesses
The State argues in this instance that Mr. Winward cannot demonstrate ineffective
assistance of counsel by his attorney failing to call these witnesses (Appellee's Brief at
page 47). However, as noted in Appellant's Brief, the Housekeeper and Lenkhart cases
demonstrate otherwise {State v. Housekeeper, 2008 UT 78. State v. Lenkhart 2011 UT
27.) . These two cases have already been briefed in Appellant's Brief, but the State does
not address either of them. Mr. Winward submits on these cases and how Mr. Winward's
case is substantially similar to the facts of these cases. By failing to address these two
13
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cases, Mr. Winward is left to conclude that the State agrees with his arguments.
The State further argues that these proposed witnesses are merely speculative and
unspecified testimony (Appellee's Brief at page 46). However, in Appellant's Brief, Mr.
Winward spelled out each witness and what he or she would have brought to the table
had he or she actually been called to testify as a witness. A summary is provided of each
witness, as follows:
T.W.'s Caseworker: This witness was an independent third party witness, who
could have been used to impeach the alleged victims in this case, just as the scoutmaster
and teacher could have been utilized as well. In a credibility case such as this, the more
witnesses who can refute the alleged victim's testimonies, particularly in different
aspects, the more problems with the credibility of the alleged victims. As mentioned in
Appellate's Brief, T.W. was interviewed by this caseworker, who also recorded the
interviews. These taped interviewed should have been introduced through Brass to show
more inconsistent statements and further demonstrate the possibility of coaching, which
could also be extrapolated to the other witnesses. By failing to call this witness, Mr.
Winward was prejudiced by an unfair trial resulting in an egregious injustice.
Forensic Child Psychologist: Appellant's Brief already described this witness
succinctly, as follows: "A defense expert could have turned the trial alone, especially in
conjunction with the lack of physical evidence, to offer a plausible explanation as to why
children in this age bracket would potentially testify the way they did, absent the actual
occurrence of the alleged events, and to further explore the critical issue of coaching."
14
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(Appellee's Brief at page 41). Although the State argues that "acceptable representation
under Strickland 'entitle[s] counsel to 'balance limited resources in accord with effective
trial tactics and strategies.'" (Appellee's Brief at page 46, quoting from Harrington v.
Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 789 (2011)), Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedures
would have been available to compensate for the expert witness fees, so the balancing of
limited financial resources should not have been a consideration.
Medical Expert: Here, the State argues that "cross-examination of the
State's expert will often suffice." (Appellee's Brief at page 47, quoting from Id. at 791).
However, "often suffice" does not cut it when, as in this case, the medical expert's
testimony was a necessity to Mr. Winward's defense. Plainly put, cross-examining the
State's expert did not suffice and Mr. Winward has now suffered an egregious injustice
by being convicted. As mentioned above, in this type of credibility contest, Brass was
ineffective for failing to produce an expert witness to impeach the alleged victims'
testimony with an expert opinion, one that would carry even more sway than the other,
fact-based independent third party witnesses. With the inconsistencies in the victims'
testimony more thoroughly examined and with an expert to provide his medically-based
opinion, this likely would have resulted in an acquittal for Mr. Winward.
Therefore, the failures by Mr. Winward's trial attorney to provide as witnesses
T.W.'s caseworker, a forensic psychologist, and an expert medical witness, is clearly
ineffective counsel and promoted an egregious injustice against Mr. Winward's trial,
resulting in his ultimate conviction.
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g. Mr. Winward's trial counsel was ineffective for raising his own
ineffectiveness on appeal
i

The State argues here that "the Utah Court of Appeals rejected the ineffectiveness
claim55 (Appellee's Brief at page 47). The State also argues that Mr. Winward suffered
{

no prejudice. Again, the evidence says otherwise.
The State relies in its argument that the Utah Court of Appeals has already decided
the ineffectiveness claim and found there to be none. This argument is unpersuasive,
however, because Brass handled that very case. As mentioned previously, Brass had
little motivation to point out his own deficiencies, and in fact, had every motivation to
prove that he was effective, so as to protect his own interests. Of course, this is contrary
to protecting Mr. Winward's interests. This is an inherent conflict of interest which
tainted the proceedings in the Court of Appeals. Furthermore, by raising the issue
himself, Brass has already admitted he was ineffective as counsel, at least on the
particular issues he brought before the Court of Appeals.
The State also argues that Mr. Winward "fails to identify any specific argument or
evidence that a different attorney could have raised that would have produced a different
result." (Appellee's Brief at page 48). The petition in this case addresses those claims
already. Remarkably, Brass failed to bring up any of these claims in his appeal, only
arguing that he should have objected during the State's closing arguments.

The

remaining arguments for ineffective assistance of counsel are contained in the petition in
this case and have been briefed extensively. These claims show that a different result
would have likely ensued and because Mr. Winward was convicted with these trial
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deficiencies, he suffered prejudice and an egregious injustice occurred in his case.
h. Mr. Winward has shown cumulative error
The State argues that Mr. Winward has not shown any meritorious claims and
therefore the cumulative error doctrine fails.

On the contrary, Mr. Winward has

demonstrated each error and how each one prejudiced him. Each claim itself was enough
to show that he was prejudiced and had an unfair trial. This is buttressed by his first trial,
without most of these errors, resulting in a hung jury. Thus, these cumulative errors have
resulted in an egregious injustice and Mr. Winward's convictions should therefore be
reversed and remanded for a new trial.
DATED this J_

day of March, 2012.
Respectfully Submitted by:

M^)
Matthew G. Morrison
Attorney for Appellant
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